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Introduction
Technical cooperation (TC) comprises heterogeneous
activities, involving numerous financing and technical
agencies, located in many very diverse countries. To
develop a bird's eye view of overall effectiveness, an
extensive evaluation literature was reviewed. It covers
many economic activities, in addition to TC's
functional forms which include 1. pre-feasibility and
feasibility studies for capital projects; 2. engineering
design and construction oversight for capital projects;
3. research; 4. institution-building projects (free-
standing or combined with capital projects); 5. policy
studies; 6. individual free-standing fellowships (ie not
part of an institution-building or capital project); 7.
individual expert services (consultancies; seconded
expatriates); 8. short-term training (seminars, study
and observation tours, equipment familiarisation).
The difference between technical and capital assistance
is clear enough in practice, although in many projects
the two are intimately linked. The fact that technology
is often 'transmitted' as embodied in a piece of
equipment has been seen at times as blurring the
distinction between technical activities and aid in the
form of commodities. For our purposes we do not
consider technology transfer in the form of mere
embodiment as a TC process.
Methodology and Evaluation. For convenience we
divide the effects of TC projects into proximate and
ultimate. Proximate effects are the direct or immediate
objectives (project 'outputs' in the evaluation
methodology literature). Ultimate effects are the
further objectives, in time and nature, expected to
result from the project's outputs. In general,
proximate effects are instrumental, je trained people,
skills, institutional capabilities, etc., expected to have
ultimate effects on production, efficiency and other
aspects of economic activity and growth.
Proximate effects are easier to specify unambiguously
and are more commonly identified in evaluations. The
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ultimate effects extend long into the future and are
more difficult to specify and relate to a project, since
ultimate goals tend to become 'joint products' of many
preceding activities of which the aid projects are only a
part. Project documentation normally deals with
sequential effects only very generally, and they are
increasingly difficult and costly to track and evaluate
as time passes.
There is no ready methodology for measuring TC
effectiveness. A TC activity can have several objectives
that can be thought of as successive stages of impact.
Take a project to help a country establish an
agricultural extension training institution designed to
help increase food output. We can imagine a series of
stages through which the project's effects must pass
before it can achieve its ultimate objective. Has the
project delivered its inputs as planned? Have they
combined with local inputs as planned? Has the
institutional capability been created? Has the
institution gone on to function as expected? Have the
graduates been employed as planned? Have the
farmers adopted their recommendations? Did the
expected increases in productivity result? Were the
farmers able to sell their increased production? Are the
marketing systems such that the farmers and other
economic agents involved received sufficient return so
that the processes can be expected to continue to
operate?
If the answers are yes all along, the project is effective.
(Project 'efficiency' refers to how well the project was
implemented - quality of experts and training,
adherence to planned schedules, etc.). If the answer is
no at some point, the rest of the sequence may collapse
together with the preceding steps. But the latter stages
may fail for reasons apart from the project. The
project may have been a complete success in its own
frame, but failed to have the expected benefits for
reasons operating in realms apart from the project.
(Whether it was cost-effective is a related but different
question.)
Wrong conclusions may be reached about the
effectiveness (or at least the efficiency) of the aid
process itself if the chain of events is blocked by
macro- or sector-level, or other, exogenous fact )rs. In
planning a project, it is critical to think about this
chain, in order to take account of the framework that
will mediate the effects of the proximate outputs.
There are also some TC subjects that have multiple
effects that cumulate over time to greatly exceed the
original objectives. For example, in the 1950s very few
developing countries could collect, process and
publish timely statistics. Years of assistance played a
key role in the development of statistical offices in a
large number of countries. As local capacities grew,
the UN and bilateral programmes shifted attention
and developed new TC capabilities themselves to
assist the national offices in adding new capabilities
(eg the household sample survey programme) to the
census and other subjects that were the focus of earlier
years. Each of the statistical areas where this capacity-
building was taking place can feed research, planning
and decision-making in many sectors and problem
areas of development, enabling the data users to
increase the effectiveness of their programmes and
resource allocations.
A critic of aid might suspect the objectivity of the
evidence on effectiveness since almost all of it is
produced by the aid agencies themselves. In our view
such suspicion is not warranted; the agencies'
published evaluation materials contain much frank
discussion of problems and failures, giving sceptïcs
plenty of ammunition for criticism as will be evident
below.
Finally it is important to note that the evaluation
evidence is negatively biased. Even if allowance is
made for those aid agencies that publish no evaluation
results and for dirty linen not publicly washed,
evaluators tend to emphasise what went wrong as they
reach for conclusions on how to improve future
performance. Also, evaluation has focused on the
more difficult sectors, eg rural development, irrigation,
agriculture generally, to the relative neglect of hi-tech
or highly specialised engineering or scientific areas.
The latter subjects (remote sensing and meteorology
are good examples) contain much apparently very
successful TC experience, but relatively little evaluation
'evidence'. The TC task is easier than in the former
subjects, where effectiveness requires wide diffusion of
new knowledge and adoption of changed behaviour
on the part of numerous less educated, low-income
beneficiaries.
Efficiency Lessons
Despite the limitations of the evidence and the
heterogeneity of the subject, the results are significant
to the extent that the literature does attempt
numerically to record success and failure against
proximate or immediate objectives. The several
hundred evaluated projects tend to fall in the range of
one-half to two-thirds judged satisfactory, of which
one-third or more are judged fully satisfactory. Total
failures range between 10 and 15 per cent.
Performance one-third unsatisfactory and with only
one total failure out of ten would put TC well within
an acceptable performance level. The record also
suggests that general condemnations of TC projects as
ineffective (or counter-productive) have lacked
discrimination and have erred by drawing conclusions
from very selective evidence. The serious questions
concern the factors that determine effectiveness in
different country situations, the relevance and
adaptability of external technology, the ability to learn
from experience, and how to overcome political and
bureaucratic constraints to further raising of success
rates.
The literature amply documents inefficiencies in:
project design; government commitment; timing and
quality of project inputs (experts, training, equipment);
technology; getting trainees to return to their jobs;
participation of actual technology users (cg farmer
'beneficiaries') in decision-making about project
design and implementation; coordination with, and
commitment of, cooperant domestic agencies outside
the project itself; consistency of sector policy
framework with project assumptions; coordination of
related donor activities; technical backstopping of
experts by the supplying agency; and sensitivity and
adaptation to local cultural factors.
The efficiency lessons are similar across sectors, even
across projects. They are generally commonsense
conclusions about good management. Efficient
management of international TC is probably more
difficult to attain and sustain than the average run of
public affairs. The significant question for each agency
is whether the overall level of shortfall is at a low
enough rate of acceptability, and whether adequate
efforts are being made to use evaluation as an integral
part of management to continue to raise the level of
efficiency.
In this respect, evaluation appears to have much
further to go. Feedback appears to be more a matter of
casting bread upon the waters than of systematic
procedures for informing or retraining all those with a
need to know, and ensuring (as does one door agency
to our knowledge) that subsequent decision-making
must take account of previous relevant findings. Even
the bread-casting has limitations in terms of numbers
of copies printed, and instances where agencies issue
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and widely distribute brief summaries. While progress
has been made, there is room for much better
utilisation of evaluation findings.
While the project development process differs from
one agency to another, it typically involves two
groups: technical and programme formulators, and
programme and policy reviewers and decision-
makers. To ensure that evaluation lessons are being
learned and taken into account in the design of new
activities, and that institutional memory is being
passed along to new personnel, agencies should
consider imposing on both these groups mandatory
review of relevant evaluation findings. Project
formulators could be required to cite evaluation
material reviewed in their documentation, and to
show how the proposed new activity takes account of
past lessons. The review and decision-making process,
especially if it takes an adversarial form, could also be
required to judge new activities against the relevant
evaluation record. The record could be strengthened
by requiring evaluation units to draw general
conclusions for operations and policy, and by
informing technical and managerial personnel in each
agency of the lessons drawn in other agencies.
Development of country evaluation capabilities
should be a subject of more TC than has been the case
so far.
Some of these shortcomings will be found in virtually
all situations. It is striking that the same assistance
machinery, working in the same subjects, has made
substantial impact in many countries that have
experienced satisfactory modernisation and develop-
ment, and appears unable to make a difference (or
sufficient difference) in many other countries.
Virtually all the evaluations of groups of projects of
the same type show a higher proportion of
disappointing results in Africa than in East or South
Asia. The success of the Green Revolution TC in India
(see Toye's paper in this Bulletin) contrasts sharply
with the failure (thus far) of the same donor agencies
and operating systems to make significant break-
throughs in African grain production. The same
handful of agencies made important contributions to
very successful family planning programmes (as in
Indonesia), but were unable to bring either policies in
much of sub-Saharan Africa, or programme imple-
mentation in Bangladesh, to any comparable level.
Where the political and socioeconomic context is
favourable, the inefficiencies of the aid process do not
appear serious enough to prevent effective TC. Where
conditions are unfavourable, the systemic inefficiencies
prevent projects from being designed and implemented
with the maximum efficiency possible under the
circumstances, in environments where projects must
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be exceptionally well planned and executed to have a
chance for significant impact. In addition, the
machinery has apparently adapted its TC activities
adequately where the performance has been broadly
satisfactory; but has had less success in local
adaptation to noticeably offset the contextual
impediments to effectiveness in other countries, where
the record has been unsatisfactory. This last point is
particularly important for TC effectiveness in the so-
called 'least developed countries', most of which are
located in sub-Saharan Africa.
Determinants of Effectiveness
We summarise the key determinants of effectiveness,
aside from efficiency of project execution. TC
effectiveness is more difficult to achieve:
the further the country is from self-reliance in
institutions and skills;
the greater the cultural difference between source
country (of the technology, experts and training) and
recipient country, with respect to the activity involved;
the greater the differences in ecology between
developed and developing countries, with consequent
need for extensive adaptation of biologically-based
technologies;
the 'softer' the subject of the activity, ie the more
the TC is directed at institution-building, activities
requiring changes in social structures or behaviour, or
development service functions (eg health, education);
the larger the 'adoption community' that must
absorb and apply the technology or functions
involved;
the more poorly endowed the region, especially
within a country where competing regions are
developing more dynamically and have weak linkages
for pulling along the backward areas;
the more the TC focuses directly on the least-
advantaged, least educated, least risk-taking segments
of a country's population;
the more dependent for its effects the individual
project is on other cooperant agencies and policies,
especially if the latter have to be changed.
In each sector lessons have been learned about the
characteristics of technology transfer and institution-
building peculiar to the subject. In some cases, a
learning and feedback process has resulted in
completely new strategies. 1. In health, the failure in
many countries to make a dent in most major causes of
morbidity resulted in a shift of strategy toward
community-based, prevention-orientated primary care
in contrast to the traditional approach of hospital-
based, curative medicine. While some fuunctional
'campaign' strategies have been very powerful (eg
smallpox eradication, oral rehydration), the main
thrust of TC health strategy is now to assist countries
to build up primary care syst ems. 2. In nomadic
herding, TC that was dependent on changing age-old
social and economic behaviour has failed and still
lacks effective approaches. The lessons of failure have
been drawn, but effective approaches have yet to be
developed. 3. The Green Revolution experience taught
many useful lessons about the interaction between
technical change, the framework of agricultural
policy, and the incentives for farmers to adopt new
technologies. It is probably as a result of this
experience that much greater emphasis is being placed
on agricultural policy in Africa than was the case
earlier in agricultural work in Asia. 4. The record in
agricultural extension is very mixed, although a shift
to new approaches in recent years in India (under TC
auspices) appears to be significantly more effective
(see, however, Toye's article in this Bulletin).
As for context, there are two dimensions. First,
repeatedly, effectiveness of the individual project has
been seriously diminished because of factors outside
the project itself, eg unfavourable price policy
framework or failure of other parties to take expected
actions; thus project design must be improved to take
these factors into account. Forestry is an interesting
case. Despite the recognised high professional quality
of FAO and bilateral TC, and the development of the
'social forestry' concept more apposite to Third World
conditions than forestry strategies of the industrial
countries, forestry faces very powerful and destructive
demographic and economic forces. In such conditions,
to continue to provide TC, where the proximate
objective of the project is attained but the resultant
technical capacity remains unutilised, is wasteful of
TC resources, and wasteful if not counterproductive
for the country. If the TC agency wishes to obtain
assurances that the necessary measures will be taken,
outside the scope of the project itself, the agency may
be raising issues that appear 'inappropriate', or of a
character that probes into the operations of other
agencies or policies not within the jurisdiction of the
institution or ministry hosting the project in question.
Many agencies' project planning procedures require
the designers to describe the ultimate development
objective of the project, to which its proximate outputs
will contribute, and to specify the policies and/or
activities required of other organisations if the project
is to achieve that objective. If the project is large
enough, these requirements may take the form of
conditions precedent, or formal understandings that
the government will take the specified steps. Even
though made in good faith, such undertakings often
prove disappointing. When the donor, in the interests
of businesslike management and responsible admini-
stration of public funds, insists on more careful or
rigorous attention to these wider circles of project-
related matters, the government may regard this
'extension' or 'conditioning' as excessive intervention
in domestic affairs. However, where the evaluation
evidence suggests that the project will not work
otherwise, both provider and recipient need to tackle
these problems seriously, if the concern over aid-
effectiveness is genuine.
The second contextual determinant of effectiveness is
the level of a country's development: the degree to
which the existing institutions and capabilities are able
to absorb and exploit the technical and material
resources provided from outside. The observation that
technology transfer and TC effectiveness increases
through time, along with rising skills and institutional
capacities, implies that effectiveness would normally
be lower among the least developed countries.
On the broadest level, TC is part of the whole
international development effort that has not
succeeded in helping to achieve satisfactory overall
development in much of Africa. In many of its
specifics, lower levels of TC achievement are also
evident. Agricultural research has yet to produce
'breakthroughs' or even substantial accumulations of
incremental improvements that can be shown to be
widely applicable to reverse the decline in per capita
food output. The problems in nomadic pastoralism
have been mentioned. In health, much African
endemic disease takes forms (or is transmitted by
vectors) not found elsewhere, and for which no
effective counter-measures are yet available.
Independence a mere decade or two ago found many
of these countries with rudimentary education systems
and tiny cadres of people with middle or high level
training. The internal brain drain from government
and other aided institutions to the higher-paying
private sector will not be alleviated by saturation from
accumulated trained labour supplies for many years.
This makes institution-building more difficult.
In the face of these problems, TC effectiveness is
bound to be relatively low in many endeavours for
some time, even were the policy framework closer to
optimum. Most of the effectiveness-reducing list
(above) applies to the countries where development is
proving more difficult. The problem of how to
accelerate development in Africa goes beyond an
examination of TC effectiveness, but a few observations
pertinent to the objectives of TC can be made.
First, time, persistence and adequate scale of effort
have brought to their present state of middle-income
development other countries that were once deemed
unlikely to overcome the hindrances to their
development. Some of the problems cited reflect
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simply the very few years in which modern science has
been addressing African problems. It will take time
and persistent application of international resources
before agricultural and health research in particular
begins to yield significant results.
Second, the bedrock problem underlying much of the
difficulties of TC in Africa (aside from civil
disruption) is probably the distance yet to go in
education. In this context it is regrettable that donors
no longer favour large fellowship programmes in
general development skills (economics, accounting,
engineering, administration, etc.) not associated with
specific projects, and large-scale overseas education
programmes which could take advantage of presently
under-utilised university capacity in the industrial
countries.
Third, the list also specifies the substance of the
familiar 'absorptive capacity' problem. Regardless of
the political preferences from one country to another
for more or less scope for private initiative, or more or
less decentralisation of public-sector functions, there
are powerful reasons for arguing that development
will be enhanced in countries that open many levels,
areas and organisational forms to the benefits of TC,
compared with countries where central government is
the only instrument for absorption of external
assistance and technology. Encouragement of
expanded social and economic roles of NGOs and
local government, and of their direct access to TC
programmes, could be a way around the absorptive
capacity problems posed by inadequate institutional
development, shortage of management in skills in
government, the need for diversity and experimentation
in social and behavioural change, and the need to
expand outreach in agricultural and health technology
diffusion. The TC community needs to develop more
effective ways of reaching indigenous NGOs and
helping them to develop more rapidly.
Fourth, the mistakes that arise because of cultural
differences can probably be reduced by greater use of
(non-economics) social scientists in project design
work. This shoiuld be done through increased
employment of social scientists by aid agencies (their
numbers are now miniscule), and by regular use of
local social scientists as consultants, especially for
rural projects and activities in the 'soft' sectors.
The evaluation literature frequently singles out the
expert, and the expert-counterpart relationship, as a
key element of TC needing strengthening. The great
increase in expert costs in recent years is particularly
troublesome. More use of volunteer programmes and
of local expertise is recommended, but the greatest
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scope for cost reduction (and for increasing the
number of expert-months that can be financed by any
given project) lies with recruitment of developing
country nationals with salaries set in accordance with
prevailing local market compensation for professionals
rather than at international levels. For bilateral
agencies this means 'untying' aid for expert
recruitment among developing countries. For the UN
system this would require development of a two-track
personnel system. Neither of these routes would be
easy.
For all the years of agency experience in expert
recruitment, it remains a problem that technical
quality and personal facility as counterpart and
advisor are often inadequate. While these problems
stem partly from simple failure of management to
persist in applying recruitment lessons learned many
times over, they might also be reduced if TC agencies
trained experts in cross-cultural communication and
techniques for effective inter-personal relations. Both
governments and agencies could be much tougher in
refusing to retain in the system individuals with
demonstrated technical insufficiency or inability to
work well in foreign environments.
Coordination and Programme Planning
Between the increasing multilateral development bank
(MDB) resources devoted to TC and institution-
building (or at least institution-strengthening), the
relative stagnation of donor contributions for TC
activities of UN system agencies, and the apparent
increase in IBRD (and to a lesser extent other MDB)
concern over the substance of TC and institution-
building theory and operations, there is a strong
possibility that the traditional distinction between
MDBs and capital projects and UN system (UNDP
and specialised agencies) will break down. Intellectual
and operational leadership in TC may drift to the
MDBs, in particular IBRD. These changes pose
serious issues for the internal staffing and operations
of the MDBs, and for the relations and coordination
processes between MDBs and agencies, especially in
the field.
The programming processes for allocating TC
resources in any one country are notoriously
uncoordinated. For country planning authorities, the
very processes for receiving and allocating external aid
create hindrance. The country must cope with a large
number of agencies that vary with respect to the ways
in which their resources are programmed and can be
obtained: multi-year planning cycles vary in length
and initial year, and may not coincide with the
country's own planning cycle; most bilateral donors
have priorities of their own that limit the subjects or
goals for which their aid can be used; the procedures,
information and planning documentation require-
ments differ; aid organisations have different practices
with respect to the size, authority and capability of
field-level representation, and the speed and efficiency
of the programming role of headquarters; the ability,
or willingness, of aid agencies to coordinate their
country-level planning varies among countries and
subjects. Even without a conspiracy theory, one would
expect that inertia, or the simple desire to avoid
diverting time from getting on with the job, would
militate against coordination, in the absence of
deliberate arrangements built around common
programmes or financing structures, or mandated by a
host government.
The developing countries also vary with respect to the
ability to develop a planning framework or efficient
coordinating machinery. Some governments prefer, or
even require, that aid agencies do not coordinate
programming among themselves. More commonly,
one finds government aid coordinating agencies that
channel and administer the external inflow but do
little substantive planning, especially of TC which they
find difficult to allocate according to a scheme of
priorities that would result in pressures from
ministries that did not get their 'share'. Rational
planning is not helped by conflicting advice from
external agencies, and by the need of overburdened
senior staff to devote much time to dealing with
visiting officials.
Repeated efforts have been made to rationalise these
processes, but, except in countries where government
have developed the ability to orchestrate these flows
themselves, it would be difficult to demonstrate
systemic improvement. Within the UN there is a long
history of efforts to grapple with programming
inefficiencies. Some UN agencies have resisted closer
coordination; the effort of the General Assembly to
induce the system to use the UNDP country
programme as a 'framework' for other agency
programming has produced little result. Donor
governments have contributed to the coordination
problems by channelling increasing funds directly to
the specialised agencies, causing a steady decline in
UNDP's relative funds and a concomitant weakening
of the relative size of the country allocations and of the
reality of the idea of the UNDP programmes as the
framework for planning the entire system's allocation.
One can only conclude that the governments most
forcefully engaged in drafting the UN operational
legislative landmarks (including some developing-
country governments) have lost interest in the
rationalising objectives that were earlier seen as
essential for improving the system's effectiveness, or
have been unable to consort effectively in the face of
inertia, jurisdictions and non-developmental
considerations.
The efficiency problems of TC programming have
their parallel in actual operations. Coordination
among agencies working in the same subject is often
poor. In many mundane details, the sheer numbers of
actors and the legislative and systemic (if not political)
differences cause daily inefficiencies that reduce aid-
effectiveness. Examples are: inadequate exchange of
information; poor coordination even where the
interdisciplinary nature of the subject has been
prominently proclaimed by the aiding organisations;
difficulties in coordinating because agency field
personnel with different degrees of delegated
authority for decision-making on the spot; and
personal rivalries among UN system field
representatives.
Listing operational woes cannot be interpreted as a
general indictment or characteristic description of a
complex system operating on several continents.
Cooperation among UN funding agencies, and
between them and bilaterals, tends to be much better
than with technical UN agencies. Professional
cooperation in the field is often excellent, and one
often finds informal coordination arrangements built
around subjects or local institutions. Coordination
depends heavily on local 'personalities'.
Willingness to coordinate, and even the general level
of technical competence and implementation efficiency,
vary enormously within UN agencies. Inside some of
the largest, some technical divisions merit the highest
international respect for quality of performance, while
others have very mixed reputations. The overall
performance of the TC agencies could be substantially
improved if the lagging units in each agency could be
brought up to the high standards of the best
operational units.
Our own impression is that the 'average' situation in
the field is 'less than satisfactory', ie, that significant
improvement in TC efficiency could be attained if
these problems could be ameliorated. They become
less of a hindrance to TC effectiveness as the
administrative capabilities of a recipient government
strengthen. By the same token they are likely to be
most severe in least developed countries, compounding
the inherently greater difficulties of effective TC there.
The 'less than satisfactory' rating is most applicable in
these countries. It should be treated as totally
unacceptable by the aid community.
An important aspect of self-reliance is a country's
ability to make effective use of aid resources. The
crucial objective in coordination of aid donors and
agencies, therefore, should be the development of
government capacity to do the job. Many countries
have aid coordination units, but many of these are
primarily administrative rather than substantive in
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their work. UNDP would be the most appropriate
agency to assist governments in developing such
capacity.
Where governments feel unable to devote staff
resources to coordination, they may prefer and
encourage (or require) aid agencies to develop
arrangements in which the government would
participate. Such arrangements can run from mere
exchange of information to highly structured
relationships for coordinating planning and operations.
In particular subjects where several agencies are
conducting projects involving the same institutions
and officials, ad hoc coordinating committees have
often proved useful, whether run by government or a
donor agency. In food and nutrition, for example,
both UNDP and UNICEF have had successful
experience along these lines. These arrangements tend
to rely on individual initiative, and not on models
developed through coordination at headquarters
level. While no one model would be appropriate for all
local situations, more local initiative for coordination
would be forthcoming if headquarters were to
enunciate clear desire for such. Apparently the
General Assembly resolutions on this problem have
not been adequate.
It is proposed that the aid project process be
consolidated in countries where government admini-
strative capacity is being overstretched by the very size
and variation of a multitude of donor projects.
Consolidation could take the form of settling on a
narrower range of objectives, institutions and
strategies for concentrating donor efforts. Institution-
building could be enhanced by ensuring a scale of
training that could deliberately take account of an
expected 'drain' rate, and accumulating sufficient
donor financing of local recurrent costs to protect the
institutions from unanticipated local budget problems.
Very helpful would be agreement among donors and
agencies to require only a single set of documentation
covering all external inputs and descriptors of the
project, with each donor then meeting its own
documentation requirements internally without further
involvement of host government officials.
Joint or parallel projects are often undertaken by
groups of donors. They are useful arrangements, for
example, for advisory projects where acceptability is
enhanced by sponsorship by more than one country.
What is envisaged here is a focusing of effort on the
programme level so that sectoral studies and dialogue
are also reduced in scope and made easier for the
government to handle. Involvement of several donors
and agencies in a joint activity can also lead to delay
and added administrative nuisance if each party insists
on consensus on all matters as they arise, and if the
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purposes and activity designs are not fully spelled out
and accepted by all parties at the start. The key to such
arrangements is the quality of coordinating leadership.
A useful service to many countries would be the
occasional drafting of a TC 'sectoral' review. It should
perform, for training and institution-building, and
associated TC, a function analogous to that of IBRD
economic memoranda for reviewing the state of an
economy. The review could describe and assess the
programmes of the donors and agencies, the relevant
government policies, the state and adequacy of
coordination arrangements, regional or sectoral
patterns of donor allocations, trends in the volume of
TC and their relationship to requirements, operational
problems, emerging areas of technical need, arti-
culation between domestic and inter-country TC
activities, TC implications of a new five-year
development plan, and findings of recent TC
evaluations. A review of this sort could be done each
year by the government TC agency or as part of the
Annual Report on Development Cooperation now
routinely done (but mainly limited to project
information) by the Resident Coordinators, or as a
separate occasional study.
Finally, on efficiency and coordination: governments
have the determining influence on the operations of
the multilateral institutions. Donors determine the
system through the ways they coordinate their
bilateral programmes, and through their funding
decisions and the positions they take on governing
bodies regarding the UN system's operations.
Developing countries help determine the system
through the arrangements they impose, or tolerate, in
their own countries and on agency governing bodies.
It all boils down to a simple question: do governments
with major voices in the assistance system care enough
about effectiveness to take the strengthening steps
necessary, or are the political costs of doing so judged
too great to bother?
High-tech poses novel problems for effectiveness
compared with TC in traditional subjects, stemming
from the high rate of change in these technologies, the
rapid obsolescence of hardware, the greater infor-
mation gap between younger technicians and their
senior supervisors, the attraction of modernity and
danger of 'technology-driven' proposals. Aid agencies
need to examine high-tech TC and its peculiar
requirements for effectiveness, including how the TC
process and TC staff can keep abreast.
Finally, there is a striking weakness in the intellectual
underpinning of institution-building, human capacity
creation, and associated TC compared with the
theoretical and qualitative analysis tools that have
been developed to rationalise the planning of physical
capital formation. While some methods are available
for manpower planning and development of individual
institutions, there is little guidance for planning
institutional requirements of whole sectors, for
matching institutional needs with evolving economic
structures, or for systematically defining intersectoral
institutional linkages (analogous to the economic
input-output matrix). The basic TC objective of self-
reliance has not been defined in operationally
meaningful terms that would aid the planning of
institutional needs and facilitate rational institutional
'make or buy' decisions. While this article has
attempted to make some suggestions along these lines,
it is clear that the subject is in need of development at
the conceptual level.
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